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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated
their power on many widely adopted applications. Although
DNNs reached remarkable performance under benign settings,
their performance decreased significantly under malicious set-
tings. Accordingly, it raises serious concerns about the security of
DNNs-based approaches. In general, research about the security
issues of DNNs can be divided into two main categories, including
adversarial learning and backdoor learning. Adversarial learning
focuses on the security of the inference process, while backdoor
learning concerns about the security of the training process.
Although both studies are equally important, the research of
backdoor learning falls far behind and its systematic review re-
mains blank. This paper presents the first comprehensive survey
on the backdoor learning. We summarize and categorize existing
backdoor attacks and defenses, and provide a unified framework
for analyzing poisoning-based backdoor attacks. Besides, we also
analyze the relation between backdoor attacks and the relevant
fields (i.e., adversarial attack and data poisoning), and the
discussion about future research directions is also provided at
the end.
Index Terms—Backdoor Learning, Security, Deep Learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the success of deep neural networks
(DNNs) powered many practical applications. Accordingly, its
security is of great significance and has attracted extensive
concerns. For example, adversarial learning [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6], which discusses the security issues of the inference
process, is well-studied. While DNN-based methods demon-
strate its extraordinary capacities, they also require a huge
amount of training data and resources. As a result, users begin
to adopt third-party datasets, train DNNs through third-party
platforms, or even directly utilize third-party models. Such
opacities of the training process brings new security threats.
Gu et al. [7] first revealed the threat in the training pro-
cess, which is dubbed backdoor attack1. In general, backdoor
attacks aim at embedding the hidden backdoor into DNNs
so that the infected model performs well on benign testing
samples when the backdoor is not activated, similarly to the
model trained under benign settings; however, if the backdoor
is activated by the attacker, then its prediction will be changed
to the attacker-specified target label. Since the infected DNNs
perform normally under benign settings and the backdoor is
∗ indicates corresponding author(s). This work was done when Yiming Li
was an intern at Tencent AI Lab (supported by 2020 Tencent Rhino-Bird Elite
Training Program).
1Backdoor is also commonly called the neural trojan or trojan. We use
‘backdoor’ instead of other terms in this survey since it is most frequently
used.
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Fig. 1. An illustration of poisoning-based backdoor attacks. In this example,
the trigger is a black square on the bottom right corner and the target label is
0. Part of the benign training image is modified to have the trigger stamped
during the training process, and their label is re-assigned as the attacker-
specified target label. Accordingly, the trained DNN is infected, which will
recognize attacked images (i.e., test images containing backdoor trigger) as
the target label while still correctly predict the label for the benign test images.
activated by the attacker-specified trigger, it is difficult for the
user to realize the existence of the backdoor. Accordingly, the
insidious backdoor attack is a serious threat to DNNs.
Training data poisoning is currently the most straightfor-
ward and common way to encode backdoor functionality
into the model’s weights during the training process. As
demonstrated in Fig. 1, some training samples are modified by
adding an attacker-specified trigger (e.g., a local patch). These
modified samples with attacker-specified target label and be-
nign training samples are fed into DNNs for training. Note
that the trigger is not necessarily visible and the ground-truth
label of poisoned samples is also not necessarily different from
the target label, which increases the stealthiness of backdoor
attacks. Poisoning-based attacks can be divided into different
sub-categories based on different criteria. Besides, certain
non-poisoning-based backdoor attacks were also discussed by
recent research [8], [9], [10], [11].
Different methods were proposed to defend against back-
door attacks, which can be divided into empirical backdoor
defenses and certified backdoor defenses two main categories.
Empirical backdoor defenses are proposed based on some
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2observations or understandings of existing attacks and have
decent performance in practice, whereas their effectiveness
have no theoretical guarantee and may probably be bypassed
by some adaptive attacks. In contrast, the validity of certified
backdoor defenses is theoretically guaranteed under certain
assumptions, whereas it is generally weaker than that of
empirical defenses in practice. How to better defend backdoor
attacks is still an important open question.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive overview of
the current status of backdoor learning and some insights
about future research directions. The rest of this paper is
organized as follows. Section II briefly describes and explains
common technical terms. Section III-IV provides an overview
of existing backdoor attacks. Section V demonstrates and
categorizes existing backdoor defenses. Section VI illustrates
existing benchmark datasets, while Section VII analyzes the
relation among backdoor attacks, adversarial attacks, and data
poisoning. Section VIII discusses remaining challenges and
suggests future directions. The conclusion is provided in
Section IX at the end.
II. DEFINITION OF TECHNICAL TERMS
In this section, we briefly describe and explain common
technical terms used in the backdoor learning relevant lit-
erature. We will follow the same definition of terms in the
remaining paper.
• Benign model refers to the model trained under benign
settings.
• Infected model refers to the model with hidden back-
door(s).
• Poisoned sample is the modified training sample used in
poisoning-based backdoor attacks for embedding back-
door(s) in the model during the training process.
• Trigger is the pattern used for generating poisoned sam-
ples and activating the hidden backdoor(s).
• Attacked sample indicates the malicious testing sample
(with trigger) used for querying the infected model.
• Attack scenario refers to the scenario that the backdoor
attack might happen. Usually, it happens when the train-
ing process is inaccessible or out of control by the user,
such as training with third-party datasets, training through
third-party platforms, or adopting third-party models.
• Source label indicates the ground-truth label of a poi-
soned or an attacked sample.
• Target label is the attacker-specified label. The attacker
intends to make all attacked samples to be predicted as
the target label by the infected model.
• Attack success rate (ASR) denotes the proportion of
attacked samples which are predicted as the target label
by the infected model.
• Benign accuracy (BA) indicates the accuracy of benign
test samples predicted by the infected model.
• Attacker’s goal describe what the backdoor attacker in-
tends to do. In general, the attacker wishes to design an
infected model that performs well on the benign testing
sample while achieving high ASR.
• Capacity defines what the attacker/defender can and
cannot do to achieve their goal.
• Attack/Defense approach illustrates the process of the
designed backdoor attack/defense.
III. POISONING-BASED BACKDOOR ATTACKS
In the past three years, many backdoor attacks were pro-
posed, which can be divided into two main categories, in-
cluding poisoning-based and non-poisoning-based backdoor
attacks. Within two groups, poisoning-based ones currently
received more extensive attention. In this section, we sum-
marize and categorize existing poisoning-based attacks and
propose a unified framework for analyzing poisoning-based
attacks. Different partitions of poisoning-based methods are
summarized in Table I.
A. Attacks for Image and Video Recognition
1) BadNets: Embedding hidden backdoor in a model typi-
cally involves the encoding of malicious functionalities within
the model’s parameters. Gu et al. [7] first defined the backdoor
attack and proposed a method, dubbed BadNets, to inject
backdoor by tampering the training process through poisoning
some training samples. Specifically, as demonstrated in Fig. 1,
its training process consists of two main parts, including (1)
generating the poisoned image x′ by stamping the backdoor
trigger onto the benign image x to achieve poisoned sample
(x′, yt) associated with the attacker-specified target label yt,
and (2) training the model with poisoned samples as well
as benign samples. Accordingly, the trained DNN will be
infected, which performs well on benign testing samples,
similarly to the model trained using only benign samples;
however, if the same trigger is added onto a testing image,
then its prediction will be changed to the target label. The
attack scenario of BadNets includes training with third-party
datasets and platforms, which reveals serious security threats.
BadNets opened the era of this field, all follow-up poisoning-
based attacks were carried out based on it.
2) Invisible Backdoor Attacks: Chen et al. [12] first dis-
cussed the invisibility requirement of poisoning-based back-
door attacks. They suggested that the poisoned image should
be indistinguishable compared with its benign version to
evade human inspection. To fulfill such a requirement, they
proposed a blended strategy, which generates poisoned images
by blending the backdoor trigger with benign images instead
of by stamping as proposed in BadNets [7]. Besides, they
demonstrated that even adopting a random noise with a small
magnitude as the backdoor trigger can still create the backdoor
successfully, which further reduces the risk of being detected.
After that, there was a series of works dedicated to the
research of invisible backdoor attacks. In [13], Turner et al.
proposed to perturb the benign image pixel values by a back-
door trigger amplitude instead of replacing the corresponding
pixels with the chosen pattern. Li et al. [14] proposed to
regularize the `p norm of the perturbation when optimizing
the backdoor trigger. Zhong et al. [15] adopted the univer-
sal adversarial attack [16] to generate the backdoor trigger,
which minimizes the `2 norm of the perturbation. In [17],
Bagdasaryan et al. viewed the backdoor attack as a special
multi-task optimization, where they fulfilled the invisibility
3through poisoning the loss computation. Most recently, Liu
et al. [18] proposed to adopt a common phenomenon, the
reflection, as the trigger for the stealthiness.
Although a poisoned image is similar to its benign version in
invisible attacks, however, its source label is usually different
from the target label. In other words, the poisoned samples
seem to be mislabeled. Accordingly, an invisible attack still
could be detected by humans by examining the image-label
relationship of training samples. To address this problem, a
special sub-class of invisible poisoning-based attacks, dubbed
clean-label attacks was proposed, which has more serious
threats and research value. Turner et al. [13] first explored
the clean-label attack, where they leveraged adversarial per-
turbations or generative models to first modify some benign
images from the target class and then conducted the standard
invisible attack. The modification approach is to alleviate the
effects of ‘robust features’ contained in the poisoned samples
to ensure that the trigger can be successfully learned by
the DNNs. Recently, Zhao et al. [19] extended this idea in
attacking video classification, where they adopted universal
perturbation instead of a given one as the trigger pattern.
Another interesting clean-label attack method is to inject the
information of a poisoned sample generated by a previous
visible attack into the texture of an image from target class by
minimizing their distance in the feature space, as suggested
in [20]. Besides, Quiring et al. [21] proposed to conceal the
trigger as well as hide the overlays of clean-label poisoning
through image-scaling attacks [22].
3) Attacks with Well-designed Trigger: The backdoor trig-
ger is the core of poisoning-based attacks, therefore analyzing
how to design a better trigger is of great significance and has
attracted wide concerns. To the best of our knowledge, Liu
et al. [23] first explored this problem, where they proposed
to optimize the trigger so that the important neurons can
achieve the maximum values. In [14], Li et al. formulated the
trigger generation as a bilevel optimization, where the trigger
was optimized to amplify a set of neuron activations with `p
regularization for invisibility. Bagdasaryan et al. [17] treated
backdoor attacks as a multi-object optimization, and proposed
to optimize trigger and train DNNs simultaneously. Recently,
with the hypothesis that if a perturbation can induce most
samples toward the decision boundary of the target class then
it will serve as a decent trigger, [15], [19] proposed to generate
trigger through universal adversarial perturbation.
4) Physical Backdoor Attacks: Different from previous
works that adopted the setting that the attack is conducted
completely in the digital space, Chen et al. [12] first explored
the landscape of physical backdoor attacks. In [12], they
adopted a glasses as the physical trigger to mislead the in-
fected face recognition system developed in a camera. Further
exploration of attacking face recognition in the physical world
was also discussed by Wenger et al. [24]. A similar idea was
discussed in [7], where a post-it note was adopted as the trigger
in attacking traffic sign recognition. Recently, Li et al. [25]
demonstrated that existing digital attacks fail in the physical
world since the involved transformations (e.g., rotation, and
shrinkage) change the location and appearance of trigger in
attacked samples compared with the one used for training.
This inconsistency will greatly reduce the performance of
the attack. Based on this understanding, they proposed a
transformation-based attack enhancement so that the enhanced
attacks remain effective in the physical world.
5) Black-box Backdoor Attacks: Different from previous
white-box attacks, which require the knowledge of training
samples, black-box backdoor attacks adopt the settings that
the training set is inaccessible. In practice, the training dataset
is usually not shared due to privacy or copyright concerns,
therefore black-box attacks are more realistic than white-
box ones. Specifically, black-box backdoor attacks require to
generate some training samples based on the given model at
first. For example, in [23], they generated some representative
images of each class by optimizing initialized images from
another dataset such that the prediction confidence of the
selected class reaches maximum. With the reversed training
set, white-box attacks can be adopted for injecting hidden
backdoor.
6) Semantic Backdoor Attacks: The majority of backdoor
attacks assume that the trigger is independent of benign
images. Is it possible that a semantic part of samples can
also serve as the trigger such that the attacker is not required
to modify the input at inference time to deceive the infected
model? In [26], [17], Bagdasaryan et al. demonstrated that
assigning an attacker-chosen label to all images with certain
features, e.g., green cars or cars with racing stripes, for training
can create a semantic hidden backdoor in infected DNNs.
Accordingly, the infected model will automatically misclassify
testing images containing pre-defined semantic information
without the requirement of image modification.
B. A Unified Framework of Poisoning-based Attacks
In this section, we provide a unified attack framework
towards image recognition, which can be used to summarize
and analyze the aforementioned works. We first define three
necessary risks in this area, based on which we describe the
optimization process of attacks. Note that this framework can
be easily generalized towards other tasks, such as semantic
classification, speech recognition, as well.
We denote the classifier as fw : X → [0, 1]|Y|, with
X ⊂ Rd being the instance space and Y = {1, 2, · · · ,K}
being the label space. f(x) indicates the posterior vector
with respect to K classes, and C(x) = argmax fw(x)
denotes the predicted label. Let yt denotes the target label,
DL = {(xi, yi)|i = 1, . . . , Nl} indicates the labeled dataset,
and D′L = {x|(x, y) ∈ DL} indicates the instance set of DL.
Three risks involved in existing attacks are defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Standard, Backdoor, and Perceivable Risk).
• The standard risk Rs measures whether the prediction
of x (i.e., C(x)), is same with its ground-truth label
y. Its definition with respect to a labeled dataset DL is
formulated as
Rs(DL) = E(x,y)∼PDL [I{C(x) 6= y}] , (1)
4TABLE I
Summary of existing poisoning-based backdoor attacks.
mint,w E(x,y)∼PDL−DsL [I{C(x) 6= y}] + E(x,y)∼PDsL [λ1 · I{C(x
′) 6= yt}+ λ2 ·D(x′)], where t ∈ T , x′ = G(x, t).
Visible Attack D(x′) = 1. Invisible Attack Clean-label D(x
′) = 0, and yt = y.
Poison-label D(x′) = 0, and yt 6= y.
Attack with Optimized Trigger |T | > 1 Attack with Non-optimized Trigger |T | = 1
Digital Attack x′ is generated in digital space. Physical Attack Physical space is involved in generating x′.
White-box Attack DL is known Black-box Attack DL is unknown
Semantic Attack t is a semantic part of samples. Non-semantic Attack t is not a semantic part of samples.
where PDL indicates the distribution behind DL. I(a)
denotes the indicator function: I(a) = 1 if a is true,
otherwise I(a) = 0.
• The backdoor risk Rb indicates whether the backdoor
trigger t can successfully activates the hidden backdoor
within the classifier. Its definition with respect to DL is
formulated as
Rb(DL) = E(x,y)∼PDL [I{C(x′) 6= yt}] , (2)
where x′ = G(x, t) is the poisoned version of benign
sample x under generation function G(·) with trigger t.
For example, G(x, t) = α · x + (1 − α) · t is the most
commonly adopted generation function, where α ∈ [0, 1]d
and yt indicate the blended parameter and target label,
respectively.
• The perceivable risk Rp denotes whether the poisoned
sample (i.e., x′) can be detected as the malicious sample
(by human or machine). Its definition with respect to DL
is formulated as
Rp(DL) = E(x,y)∼PDL [D(x′)] , (3)
where D(·) is an indicator function: D(x′) = 1 if x′ is
detected as the malicious sample, otherwise I(x′) = 0.
Based on aforementioned definition, existing attacks can be
summarized in a unified framework, as follows:
min
t,w
Rs(DL −DsL) + λ1 ·Rb(DsL) + λ2 ·Rp(DsL), (4)
where t ∈ T , λ1 and λ2 are two non-negative trade-off
hyper-parameters, DsL is a subset of DL, and |DsL||DL| is called
poisoning rate defined in existing works [7], [12], [25].
Remark. Since the indicator function I(·) used in Rs and
Rb is non-differentiable, it is usually replaced by its surrogate
loss (e.g., cross-entropy, KL-divergence) in practice. Besides,
as we mentioned, optimization (4) can reduce to existing
attacks through different specifications. For example, when
λ1 is the poisoning rate over |DL − DsL|, λ2 = 0, and t
is non-optimized (i.e., |T | = 1), it reduces to the BadNets
[7] and the Blended Attack [12]; when λ2 = +∞ and
D(x′;x) = ||x′−x||p, it reduces to `p-ball bounded invisible
backdoor attacks [14].
C. Attacks for Other Tasks or Paradigms
In this section, we summarize the poisoning-based attack
against other tasks or paradigms.
In the area of natural language processing, Dai et al.
[27] first discussed the backdoor attack against LSTM-based
sentiment analysis. Specifically, they proposed a BadNets-like
approach, where an emotionally neutral sentence was used
as the trigger and was randomly inserted into some benign
training samples. In [28], Chen et al. further explored this
problem, where three different types of triggers (i.e., char-
level, word-level, and sentence-level triggers) were proposed
and reached decent performance. Most recently, Kurita et
al. [29] demonstrated that sentiment classification, toxicity
detection, and spam detection can also be backdoored even
after fine-tuning. Some researches also revealed the backdoor
threat towards graph neural networks (GNN) [30], [31]. In
general, an attacker-specified subgraph was defined as the
trigger so that the infected GNN will predict the target label
for an attacked graph once the subgraph trigger is contained.
Besides, the backdoor threat towards reinforcement learning
[32], [33], wireless signal classification [34], and continual
learning [35], were also studied.
The security issues of collaborative learning, especially
federated learning, have attracted extensive attention. In [26],
Bagdasaryan et al. introduced a backdoor attack to federated
learning based on amplifying the poisoned gradient on the
node servers. Besides, Bhagoji et al. [36] discussed the stealthy
model poisoning attack, and Xie et al. [37] introduced a
distributed backdoor attacks to federated learning. The back-
door attacks towards meta federated learning [38] and feature-
partitioned collaborative learning [39] were also discussed. Of
course, some works [40], [41], [42] also questioned whether
federal learning is really easy to be attacked. Except for
collaborative learning, the backdoor threat of another impor-
tant learning paradigm, e.g., the transfer learning, was also
discussed in [7], [29], [43].
D. Backdoor Attack for Good
Despite malicious purposes, how to use the backdoor attack
in the right way has also obtained preliminary explorations.
Adi et al. [44] exploited backdoor attacks in verifying model
ownership. They proposed to watermark the DNNs through
backdoor embedding. Accordingly, the hidden backdoor in the
model can be used to examine the ownership, while the wa-
termarking process still preserves original model functionality.
Recently, Sommer et al. [45] revealed how to verify whether
the server truly erases their data when users require data dele-
tion through poisoning-based backdoor attacks. Specifically,
in their verification framework, each user poisons part of its
data with user-specific trigger and target label. Accordingly,
each user can leave a unique trace in the server for deletion
verification after the server being trained on user data while
having a negligible impact on the benign model functionality.
5TABLE II
Summary of existing backdoor defenses in image recognition.
Category Sub-category Scenario Literature
Empirical Backdoor Defenses
Preprocessing-based Defenses Adopt third-party model [46], [47], [48], [49], [25]
Model Reconstruction based Defenses Adopt third-party model [46], [50], [51]
Trigger Synthesis based Defenses Adopt third-party model [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57][58]
Model Diagnosis based Defenses Adopt third-party model [59], [60], [61]
Poison Suppression based Defenses Adopt third-party dataset [62], [63]
Sample Filtering based Defenses Adopt third-party dataset/model [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69][70], [71], [62], [72]
Certified Backdoor Defenses Random Smoothing based Defenses Adopt third-party dataset [73], [74]
Note: Some literature proposed different types of defenses simultaneously, therefore they will appear multiple times in the table.
IV. NON-POISONING-BASED BACKDOOR ATTACKS
Except for poisoning-based attacks, some non-poisoning-
based attacks were also proposed. These methods inject back-
door not directly through training with poisoned samples, or
the backdoor is not activated directly through attacked samples
in the inference process.
A. Targeted Weight Perturbation
In [8], Dumford et al. first explored the non-poisoning-based
attack, where they proposed to modify the model’s parameters
directly instead of through training with poisoned samples.
The primary task in this work is face recognition, where they
assumed that the training samples can not be modified by
attackers. The attacker’s goal is to make their own face to be
granted access despite not being a valid user while ensuring
that the network still behaves normally for all other inputs. To
fulfill this target, they adopted a greedy search across models
with different perturbations applied to a pre-trained models
weights.
B. TrojanNet
Guo et al. [9] proposed TrojanNet to encode the backdoor
in the infected DNNs activated through a secret weight permu-
tation. They assumed that the infected network is used with a
hidden backdoor software which could permute the parameters
when the backdoor trigger is presented. Training a TrojanNet
is similar to the multi-task learning, although the benign task
and malicious task share no common features. Besides, the
authors also proved that the decision problem to determine
whether the model contains a permutation that triggers the
hidden backdoor is NP-complete, and therefore the backdoor
detection is almost impossible.
C. Targeted Bit Trojan
Rakin et al. [10] demonstrated a method, dubbed targeted
bit trojan (TBT), discussing how to inject a hidden backdoor
without the training process. TBT contains two main pro-
cesses, including gradient-based vulnerable bits determination
(similar to the process proposed in [23]), and targeted bits
flipping in main memory by adopting row-hammer attack [75].
The proposed method achieved remarkable performance, the
authors were able to mislead ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 dataset
with 84 bit-flips out of 88 million weight bits.
D. Attack with Trojan Module
Most recently, Tang et al. [11] proposed a novel non-
poisoning-based backdoor attack, which inserts a tiny back-
door module into the target model instead of changing param-
eters in the original model to embed backdoor. The proposed
method is model-agnostic and could be injected into most
DNNs, i.e., retraining on poisoned samples is not required.
This method significantly reduced the computational cost
compared to previous poisoning based attack methods.
V. BACKDOOR DEFENSES
To defend backdoor attacks, several backdoor defense
methods were proposed. Existing methods aim at defending
poisoning-based attacks and can be divided into two main
categories, including empirical backdoor defenses and certified
backdoor defenses. Empirical backdoor defenses are proposed
based on some understandings of existing attacks and have
decent performance in practice, whereas their effectiveness has
no theoretical guarantee. In contrast, the validity of certified
backdoor defenses is theoretically guaranteed under certain
assumptions, whereas it is generally weaker than that of
empirical defenses in practice. At present, certified backdoor
defenses are all based on the random smoothing technique
[76], while empirical defenses have multiple types of ap-
proaches. We divide existing empirical defense methods into
six main sub-categories, which is summarized in Table II and
will be further discussed in this section.
A. Empirical Backdoor Defenses
Intuitively, the poisoning-based backdoor attack is similar
to unlock a door with the corresponding key. Accordingly,
three main defense paradigms, including (1) trigger-backdoor
mismatch, (2) backdoor elimination, and (3) trigger elimina-
tion, can be adopted to defend existing attacks. Different types
of approaches were proposed towards the aforementioned
paradigms, as shown in Fig. 2 and discussed as follows.
1) Preprocessing-based Defenses: Preprocessing-based de-
fenses change the pattern of the triggers in the attacked
samples for preventing backdoor activation by introducing a
preprocessing module before the original inference process.
Liu et al. [46] were the first to exploit preprocessing as the
defense approach towards image classification tasks, where
they adopted a pre-trained auto-encoder as the preprocessor.
6(1) Trigger-backdoor Mismatch: Preprocessing-based Defenses
(2) Backdoor Elimination:
Model Reconstruction based Defenses
Trigger Synthesis based Defenses
Model Diagnosis based Defenses
Poison Suppression based Defenses
Sample Filtering based Defenses 
(Training Process)
(3) Trigger Elimination: Sample Filtering based Defenses 
(Inference Process)
(2)
(1)
(3)
Trigger
Hidden Backdoor
Fig. 2. An illustration of empirical backdoor defenses. Intuitively, poisoning-based backdoor attack is similar to unlock a door with the corresponding key.
Accordingly, three main paradigms, including (1) trigger-backdoor mismatch, (2) backdoor elimination, and (3) trigger elimination, can be adopted to defend
the attack. Different types of approaches were proposed towards aforementioned paradigms.
Inspired by the idea that the trigger region contributes most
to the prediction, a two-stage image preprocessing approach,
dubbed Februus, was proposed by Doan et al in [47]. At
the first stage, Februus utilizes GradCAM [77] to identify
influential regions, which will then be removed and replaced
by a neutralized-color box. After that, Februus adopts a GAN-
based inpainting method to reconstruct the masked region for
alleviating the adverse effect towards benign samples. Udeshi
el al. [48] proposed to utilize the dominant color in the image
to make a square-like trigger blocker in the preprocessing
stage, which was adopted to locate and remove the backdoor
trigger. This approach was motivated by the fact that placing
a trigger blocker at the position of the backdoor trigger in
the attacked image will result in a change in the prediction
of the model. Vasquez et al. [49] proposed to preprocess the
image through style transfer. Recently, Li et al. discussed the
property of existing poisoning-based attacks with static trigger
[25]. They demonstrated that if the appearance or location of
the trigger is slightly changed, then the attack performance
may degrade sharply. Based on this observation, they proposed
to adopt spatial transformations (e.g., shrinking, flipping)
as the preprocessor. Compared with previous methods, this
method is more efficient since it requires almost no additional
computational costs.
2) Model Reconstruction based Defenses: Different from
preprocessing based defenses, model reconstruction based
defenses aim at removing the hidden backdoor in the infected
model. Accordingly, even if the trigger is still contained in
the attacked samples, the prediction remains unmalicious since
the backdoor was already removed. Liu et al. [46] proposed
to retrain the given model with local benign samples starting
from the weight of the given model. The effectiveness of this
method may probably due to the catastrophic forgetting in
DNNs [78], i.e., the hidden backdoor is gradually removed as
the training goes since the re-training set contains no poisoned
samples. Motivated by the observation that the backdoor
related neurons are usually dormant for benign samples, Liu et
al. [50] proposed to prune those neurons to remove the hidden
backdoor. Besides, they proposed a ne-pruning method, which
rst prunes the DNNs and then ne-tunes the pruned network to
combine the benets of the pruning and ne-tuning defenses.
In [51], Zhao et al. showed that the hidden backdoor of the
infected DNNs can be repaired based on the mode connectivity
technique [79] with a certain amount of benign samples.
3) Trigger Synthesis based Defenses: Inspired by the fact
that the trigger is the core of the backdoor creation, trigger
synthesis based defenses were proposed, which is a two-stage
approach. Specifically, it first synthesizes the backdoor trigger
based on the infected model and then eliminates the hidden
backdoor by suppressing the effect of the trigger. This type of
defense enjoys certain similarities with the model reconstruc-
tion based defenses in the second stage. For example, pruning
and retraining are the common techniques used in removing
the hidden backdoor in both types of defenses. However, com-
pared with trigger synthesis based defenses, the information
about the trigger obtained in synthesis based defenses makes
the removal process more effective and efficient.
Wang et al. [52] first proposed to remove the hidden
backdoor based on the synthetic trigger in a ‘black-box’
scenario, where the training set is inaccessible. Specifically, the
proposed method, i.e. Neural Cleanse, first obtained potential
trigger patterns towards every class, and then determined the
final synthetic trigger and its target label based on an anomaly
detector at the first stage. In the second stage, they evaluated
two possible strategies, i.e., an early detector for identifying
the existence of trigger and a model patching algorithm based
on pruning or retraining. Similar idea was also discussed
in [58]. Qiao et al. [53] noticed that the reversed trigger
7synthesized by [52] is usually signicantly different from that
was used in the training process, inspired by which they first
discussed the generalization of the backdoor trigger. They
demonstrated that an infected model generalizes its original
trigger during the training process. Accordingly, they proposed
to recover the trigger distribution rather than a specific trigger
based on a max-entropy staircase approximator for building
a more backdoor-robust model. In [54], they showed that the
detection process used for determining the synthetic trigger
in [52] suffers from several failure modes, based on which
they proposed a new defense method. Besides, Cheng et al.
[55] revealed that the `∞ norm of the activation values can
be used to distinguish backdoor related neurons based on
the synthetic trigger. Accordingly, they proposed to perform
`∞-based neuron pruning, which removes neurons with high
activation values in response to the trigger from the final
convolutional layer, to defend against attacks. Similarly, Aiken
et al. [56] also proposed to remove the hidden backdoor by
pruning DNNs based on the synthetic trigger from another
perspective. An online Neural-Cleanse-like trigger synthesis
based defense was also discussed in [57].
4) Model Diagnosis based Defenses: Model diagnosis
based defenses justify whether the provided model is infected
through a trained meta-classifier and refuse to deploy infected
models. To the best of our knowledge, Kolouri el al. [61]
first discussed how to diagnose a given model. Specifically,
they jointly optimized some universal litmus patterns (ULPs)
and a classifier, which is further used to determine whether a
given model is infected based on the prediction of obtained
universal litmus patterns. Similarly, Xu et al. [60] proposed
two strategies to train the meta-classier without knowing the
attack strategies. Different from the previous approach where
both infected model samples and benign model samples are
required in the training set, an effective meta-classier can be
trained only with benign model samples based on the strategies
proposed in [60]. Besides, motivated by the observation that
the heatmaps from benign and infected models have different
characteristics, Huang et al. [59] proposed to adopt an outlier
detector as the meta-classifier based on three extracted features
of generated saliency maps.
5) Poison Suppression based Defenses: Poison suppression
based defenses depress the effectiveness of poisoned samples
during the training process to prevent the creation of hidden
backdoor. Du et al. [62] first explored such type of defenses,
where they adopted noisy SGD to learn differentially private
DNNs for the defense. With the randomness in the training
process, the contribution of poisoned samples will be reduced
by random noise, resulting in the creation failure of the
backdoor. Motivated by the observation that the `2 norm
of the gradient of poisoned samples have signicantly higher
magnitudes than those of benign samples and their gradient
orientations are also different, Hong et al. [63] adopted differ-
entially private stochastic gradient descent (DPSGD) to clip
and perturb individual gradients during the training process.
Accordingly, the trained model has no hidden backdoor as
well as its adversarial robustness towards targeted adversarial
attacks is also increased.
6) Sample Filtering based Defenses: Sample filtering based
defenses aim at distinguishing between malicious samples
and benign samples. Tran et al. [64] first explore such type
of defenses, where they demonstrated that poisoned samples
tend to leave behind a detectable trace in the spectrum of
the covariance of feature representations learned by DNNs.
Accordingly, the singular value decomposition of the covari-
ance matrix of feature representations can be used to filter
poisoned samples from the training set. Also inspired by the
idea that poisoned samples and benign samples should have
different characteristics in the feature space, Chen et al. [65]
proposed to identify poisoned samples through a two-stage
method, including (1) clustering the activations of training
samples of each class into two clusters and (2) determining
which, if any, of the clusters corresponds to poisoned samples.
Motivated by the fact that the backdoor trigger is input-
agnostic, Gao et al. [66] proposed to filter poisoned samples
through superimposing various image patterns and observe
the randomness of posterior probability vectors for perturbed
inputs. The smaller the randomness, the higher the probability
to be the poisoned sample. In [67], Subedar et al. adopted
model uncertainty to distinguish between benign and poisoned
samples. Tang et al. [68] demonstrated that simple target
contamination can cause the representation of a poisoned
sample to be less distinguishable from that of benign one,
therefore existing filtering-based defenses can be bypassed.
To address this problem, they proposed a more robust sample
filter based on representation decomposition and its statistical
analysis. Similarly, Soremekun et al. [69] proposed to counter
poisoned samples based on the difference between benign
samples and poisoned samples in the feature space. Different
from previous methods, Chan et al. [70] separated poisoned
samples based on the poison signal in input gradients. A
similar idea was explored in [71], where they adopted the
saliency map to identify trigger region and filter samples.
Recently, Du et al. [62] treated this problem as the outlier
detection and proposed a differential privacy based method.
Instead of distinguishing poisoned samples in the training set,
Jin et al. [72] proposed to detect the malicious samples in
the inference stage motivated by existing methods adopted in
detection-based adversarial defenses [80], [81], [82].
B. Certified Backdoor Defenses
Although multiple empirical backdoor defenses have been
proposed and reached decent performance against previous
attacks, almost all of them were bypassed by following
stronger adaptive attacks [96], [97]. To terminate such a cat-
and-mouse game, Wang et al. [73] took the rst step towards
the certied defense against backdoor attacks based on the ran-
dom smoothing technique [76]. Randomized smoothing was
originally developed to certify robustness against adversarial
examples, where the smoothed function is built from the base
function via adding random noise to the data vector to certify
the robustness of a classier under certain conditions. Similar
to [98], Wang et al. treated the entire training procedure
of the classier as the base function to generalize classical
randomized smoothing to defend against backdoor attacks.
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Summary of benchmark datasets used in image recognition.
Category Datasets # Image Size # Training Samples # Testing Samples Cited Literature
Natural Image Recognition
MNIST [83] 28× 28 60,000 10,000
[46], [8], [59], [60], [48]
[52], [65], [7], [66], [67]
[15], [35], [39], [45], [56]
[61], [62], [73], [74], [84]
[69], [72]
Fashion MNIST [85] 28× 28 60,000 10,000 [63], [69]
CIFAR [86] 32× 32× 3 50,000 10,000
[44], [64], [13], [14], [47]
[53], [60], [66], [67], [70]
[15], [20], [21], [45], [51]
[56], [61], [57], [63], [74]
[84], [69], [9], [10], [25]
[58]
SVHN [87] 32× 32× 3 73,257 26,032 [51], [9], [10]
ImageNet [88] 224× 224× 3 1,281,167 50,000
[44], [54], [68], [17], [18]
[20], [71], [74], [84], [11]
[10]
Traffic Sign Recognition GTSRB [89] 32× 32× 3 34,799 12,630
[14], [47], [55], [59], [52]
[54], [66], [68], [15], [18]
[49], [61], [57], [84], [9]
[11], [58], [72]
U.S. Traffic Sign [90] — 6,889 1,724 [50], [7], [48]
Face Recognition
YouTube Face [91] — 3,425 videos of 1,595 people [12], [50], [52], [57], [11]
PubFig [92] — 58,797 images of 200 people [52], [18], [11], [72]
VGGFace [93] — 2.6 million images of 2,622 people [23], [48], [52], [49], [43][71]
VGGFace2 [94] — 3.3 million images of 9,131 people [8], [47]
LFW [95] — 13,233 images of 5,749 people [54], [43], [71]
Note: (1) The sign sizes vary from 6× 6 to 167× 168 pixels in the U.S. Traffic Sign dataset; (2) There is no given division between the training set and
the testing set in most face recognition datasets. Users need to divide the dataset by themselves according to their needs.
In [74], Weber et al. demonstrated that directly applying
randomized smoothing, as in [73], will not provide high certied
robustness bounds. Instead, they proposed a unied framework
with the examination of different smoothing noise distributions
and provided the tightness analysis for the robustness bound.
VI. BENCHMARK DATASETS
Similar to that of adversarial learning, most of the existing
related literature focused on the image recognition task. In this
section, we summarize all benchmark datasets used at least
twice in related literature in Table III.
Those benchmark datasets can be divided into three main
categories, including natural image recognition, traffic sign
recognition, and face recognition. The first type of dataset
is the classic one in the image classification field, while the
second and third ones are tasks that require strict security
guarantees.
VII. BACKDOOR ATTACK, ADVERSARIAL ATTACK, AND
DATA POISONING
In this section, we discuss the similarities and differences
between backdoor attacks and adversarial attacks, data poison-
ing, respectively.
A. Backdoor Attacks and Adversarial Attacks
Targeted adversarial attacks and poisoning-based backdoor
attacks share many similarities in the inference phase. Firstly,
both types of attacks intend to modify the benign testing
sample to make the model misbehave. Although the per-
turbation is usually image-specified for adversarial attacks,
when the adversarial attacks are with universal perturbation
(e.g., [16], [99], [100]), those types of attacks have a similar
pattern. Accordingly, some researchers who are not familiar
with backdoor attacks may question the significance of the
research in this area.
Although adversarial attacks and backdoor attacks share cer-
tain similarities, they are equally important and have essential
differences. (1) From the aspect of the attacker’s capacity,
adversarial attackers can control the inference process (to a
certain extent) but not the training process of models. In
contrast, for backdoor attackers, parameters of the model can
be modified whereas the inference process is out of control.
(2) From the perspective of attacked samples, the perturbation
is known (i.e., non-optimized) by backdoor attackers whereas
adversarial attackers need to obtain it through the optimization
process based on the output of the model. Such optimization in
adversarial attacks requires multiple queries and therefore may
probably be detected. (3) Their mechanism has essential dif-
ferences. Adversarial vulnerability results from the differences
in behaviors of the model and humans. In contrast, backdoor
attackers utilize the excessive learning ability towards non-
robust features (such as textures) of DNNs.
B. Backdoor Attacks and Data Poisoning
Data poisoning and poisoning-based backdoor attacks share
many similarities in the training phase. They all aim at
misleading models in the inference process by introducing poi-
soned samples during the training process. However, they have
significant differences. From the perspective of the attacker’s
goal, data poisoning aims at degrading the performance in pre-
9dicting benign testing samples. In contrast, backdoor attacks
preserve the performance on benign samples, similarly with
the benign model, while changing the prediction of attacked
samples (i.e., benign testing samples with trigger) to the
target label. From this angle, data poisoning can be regarded
as the ‘non-targeted poisoning-based backdoor attack’ with
transparent trigger to some extent. From the aspect of the
stealthiness, backdoor attacks are more malicious than data
poisoning. Users can detect data poisoning by the evaluation
under the local verification set, while this approach has limited
benefits in detecting backdoor attacks.
Of course, we also have to admit that existing data poisoning
related approaches have also inspired the research on backdoor
learning due to their similarities. For example, Hong et al. [63]
demonstrated that the defense towards data poisoning may also
have benefits in defending backdoor attacks, as illustrated in
Section V-A5.
VIII. OUTLOOK OF FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In the previous sections, we provide a comprehensive review
of literature in backdoor learning and discuss the relation
of this emerging research area with several related fields.
Although a large number of works have been presented,
opportunities and challenges still exist due to the complexity
of the problem and the wideness of potential applications. In
this section, we demonstrate six potential research directions
for the backdoor learning in the future.
A. Attacks Towards Other Tasks
The success of backdoor attacks relies on the well-defined
problem based on the characteristics of the target task. For ex-
ample, how to define the backdoor trigger and its invisibility is
quiet different across different tasks and will have a significant
influence on the attack performance. Accordingly, it is of great
significance to study task-specified attack methods. At present,
the research of backdoor attacks mainly focuses on the field
of computer vision, especially image classification. However,
the research towards high-level visual tasks (e.g., denoising,
and super-resolution), and recommendation system still left far
behind and worth further exploration.
B. Novel Attacks and Applications
Existing works have demonstrated the widespread possibili-
ties for embedding backdoor(s) in DNNs and the potential for
applying backdoor learning to other applications. Exploring
new possibilities beyond existing methods and applications is
always an important research direction.
C. Trigger Design
The effectiveness and efficiency of poisoning-based back-
door attacks are closely related to its trigger patterns. Although
several heuristic design methods (e.g., design through optimiz-
ing the activation of critical neurons or design with universal
perturbation) were proposed, how to optimize the trigger to
minimize the necessary poisoned proportion remains unclear
and worth for further exploration.
D. Semantic and Physical Backdoor Attacks
Semantic and physical backdoor attacks are of great signifi-
cance and have practical usages. However, their researches are
left far behind. A better understanding of those areas would
be an important step towards eliminating the backdoor threat
in practice.
E. Effective and Efficient Defenses
Although different types of backdoor defenses have been
proposed, almost all of them can be bypassed by subsequent
attack methods. Besides, except for the pre-processing based
defense with spatial transformations proposed by Li et al.
[25], almost all existing defense methods suffer from relatively
high additional computational costs. How to defend against
backdoor attacks more effectively and efficiently is still an
important open question.
F. Mechanism Exploration
The principle of backdoor generation and the activation
mechanism of backdoor triggers are the holy grail problems
in the field of backdoor learning. The answers will be the key
to eliminate the threat of the backdoor attack, and therefore
worth continuous exploration.
IX. CONCLUSION
Backdoor learning, including backdoor attacks and back-
door defenses, is a critical and booming research area. In
this paper, we summarize and categorize existing backdoor
attacks and defenses. The backdoor attack could happen in the
scenario where the training process is not fully controlled by
the user, and can be categorized based on different criteria, as
described in this paper. We also analyze the defense techniques
and the relation among backdoor attacks, adversarial attacks,
and data poisoning. The potential research directions are
illustrated at the end. Almost all researches in this field were
completed in the last three years, and the cat-and-mouse game
between attacks and defenses is likely to continue in the future.
We hope that this paper could provide a comprehensive view
and remind researchers of the backdoor threat. It would be an
important step towards trust-worthy deep learning.
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